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“We do not torture,” claimed President George W. Bush, on the very day, 
November 7, 2005, that his administration sought the CIA’s exemption from laws 
that ban the practice. But many of Bush’s critics are equally wrong in maintaining 
that it was his administration that introduced “a new culture of cruelty” to the 
statecraft of the United States or that, by torturing detainees in Iraq and 
elsewhere, a previously lawful and moral US democracy “lost its way.”[1] 
Torture has, in fact, been a US weapon in every “small war” the US has fought, 
as it has in the counterinsurgency campaigns of other liberal democracies. What 
distinguishes the use of torture in the post-September 11 “war on terror” is the 
astonishing broadening of its scope, on the one hand, and the construction of a 
legal edifice around it, on the other. 
In 1902 Senate hearings, William Howard Taft, the governor general of the 
colonized Philippines who was elected president himself in 1908, testified about 
the “enhanced interrogation techniques” visited upon Filipinos by the US Army: 
What I am trying to do is to state…that cruelties have been inflicted; that people 
have been shot when they ought not to have been; that there have been… 
individual instances of the water cure, that torture which I believe involves 
pouring water down the throat so that the man swells and gets the impression 
that he is going to be suffocated and then tells what he knows, which was a 
frequent treatment under the Spaniards, I am told—all these things are true…. I 
know courts-martial were ordered and some courts-martial were lectured for not 
punishing more heavily than they did men whom the evidence showed had been 
guilty of that method of securing evidence. 
Taft’s interlocutor, Sen. Thomas M. Patterson (D-CO), asked him: “When a war is 
conducted by a superior race against those whom they consider inferior in the 
scale of civilization, is it not the experience of the world that the superior race will 
almost involuntarily practice inhuman conduct?” Replied the future president: 
“There is much greater danger in such a case than in dealing with whites. There 
is no doubt about that.”[2] 
A little over one hundred years later, the practices uncannily persist. The US has 
once again invaded a much smaller country for geopolitical gain. The process of 
conquest is the same: a speedy conventional victory followed by years of 
asymmetric warfare against committed nationalists. Civilians and guerrillas alike 
are subjected to torture. The perpetrators, meanwhile, receive a rebuke so mild 
as to indicate tacit endorsement of their strong-arm methods. And, not least, 
racist discourses that legitimate the US atrocities reverberate across the century. 
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Torture is often defined as the intentional infliction of suffering in order to extract 
information. Yet when democracies torture, as Darius Rejali writes in his 
encyclopedic Torture and Democracy, they usually avoid leaving physical marks. 
Precisely because waterboarding—where the victim is held upside down, his face 
covered with a wet cloth and water poured on his mouth and nose until he begins 
to drown—leaves no visible trace, it is a useful method of tormenting “enemies” 
while avoiding outside scrutiny. 
It is dispiriting to read about the creativity of torturers in exacting agonies upon 
their prey. Rejali dedicates a chapter apiece to several families of method: light, 
heat and sweat; water (including pumping, choking, showers and ice); bathtubs; 
shock; magnetos; electric currents; prods, Tasers and stun guns; whips and 
paddles; sleep deprivation; salt and spice; stress and duress; forced standing; 
fists; exhaustion; bodily restraints; noise; and pharmacological substances. 
The suffering accumulates slowly and steadily in Rejali’s comprehensively 
researched and coolly argued pages. One reads again and again about ostensibly 
democratic governments that borrow technologies of pain from one another and 
from less savory regimes, going so far as to emulate certain Gestapo methods. 
Indeed, it seems that the techniques used to torture Iraqis and Afghans in the 
“war on terror” were “reverse engineered” from a Survival, Evasion, Resistance 
and Escape (SERE) course offered to US Special Forces soldiers, among others, 
and designed to inure them to enemy torture. The course, ironically, was devised 
to reflect the North Korean methods used on US prisoners of war some 60 years 
ago.[3] 
The torments most extensively used in SERE training are hooding, sleep 
deprivation, stress positions, noise, withholding food and drink, and temperature 
extremes. The first five of these, intriguingly, are notorious as “the five 
techniques” used by the Royal Ulster Constabulary against Republican dissidents 
in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s[4]and were declared by the European 
Human Rights Commission to be in contravention of the continent’s human rights 
convention.[5] Nonetheless, British soldiers resurrected them for use against 
Iraqis in Basra in 2003.[6] And the preceding year, the same five techniques 
formed the core of a list of “enhanced interrogation methods” delineated in a 
memorandum issued by the Office of the General Counsel of the Department of 
Defense, now known as the Haynes memo, after its author William J. Haynes 
III.[7] The sangfroid with which these torture techniques were treated by 
Pentagon officials is most clearly on display in Donald Rumsfeld’s handwritten 
note in the margins of the declassified memo: “However, I stand for 8–10 hours a 
day. Why is standing limited to 4 hours?” 
Rejali traces the lineage of the forced standing, hooding and attachment of 
electric wires to the body that form the triumvirate of tortures in the iconic Abu 
Ghraib photograph. These techniques traveled from apartheid South Africa and 
authoritarian states in South and Central America to Spain and Northern Ireland 
before making their way into the Haynes memo. Rejali’s explanation of why 
torturers use hooding is instructive: “Hooding does not simply confuse prisoners, 
making them more vulnerable and confused. It also deprives the prisoner of 
information about what was done, who did it and where it happened, making 
their public testimony less useful.” 
Counterinsurgency 
In its use of torture the US differs from, say, Syria or Egypt, because while those 
regimes deploy an elaborate secret service to watch, interrogate and punish 
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domestic dissidents, the US has usually tortured insurgents on foreign soil, and 
has not maintained a centralized and clandestine apparatus of torture for use 
against Americans. Here the US is similar to other democracies: While torture at 
home would eventually be monitored, counterinsurgency campaigns occur far 
away and torture there—presented to the patriotic public as a matter of life and 
death in war—is less likely to provoke outrage. The US conquest of the Philippines, 
more or less concurrent with Britain’s asymmetric warfare against the Boers in 
South Africa, marks the beginning of the modern era of small wars. It was in 
these two wars (and that of the Spanish against the Cubans) that detention of 
guerrillas and civilians, both individually and en masse, became a central tactic of 
warfare. 
The fact that guerrillas are often indistinguishable from civilians—in that they 
often do not wear uniforms and move about freely among the populace—has 
meant that a great many civilians have been subjected to torture. The infamous 
Phoenix Program was intended to subvert the Vietnamese guerrillas’ popularity 
with villagers in South Vietnam. First conceived by the CIA and then implemented 
by the government of South Vietnam in coordination with various branches of the 
Special Forces, the program targeted civilian supporters of the guerrillas, who 
were opaquely transformed into the acronym VCI, for “Viet Cong Infrastructure.” 
The program succeeded in “neutralizing” over 60,000 “non-military Vietcong 
insurgents and sympathizers,” with 26,843 of those assassinated and the rest 
held captive and brutally tortured in the dreaded “Tiger Cages.”[8] 
Today, the US military all too frequently looks to the attempted French 
pacification of Algeria as a model. French-controlled Algeria is particularly 
relevant because there—as famously narrated in Gillo Pontecorvo’s film The Battle 
of Algiers—the use of torture in counterinsurgency reached its apogee. In her 
fluidly written Torture and the Twilight of Empire, Marnia Lazreg contends that 
torture was not, as is often argued, a terrible side effect of colonial warfare, but 
rather a central tactic of control. Lazreg’s extensive interviews with both 
French pied-noirs and Algerians show that torture was “rationalized, 
professionalized and systematized under the leadership of committed generals…. 
Torture became a standard method for screening individuals picked up during 
roundups, identity checks or operations. It was not only inflicted to get 
confessions, but also to obtain information of any kind.” 
The two best-known theoreticians of French counterinsurgency in Algeria, David 
Galula and Roger Trinquier, confirm this conclusion. After fighting as an 
infantryman in Kabylia, Galula moved to the US, where he completed Pacification 
in Algeria, 1956–1958 and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 
Practice during fellowships at the RAND Corporation and Harvard University, 
respectively. The latter volume is now on the US Army Command and General 
Staff College curriculum, and has served as inspiration for the new US 
Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, known by its military 
designation FM 3-24 and lovingly referenced by journalists and bloggers 
enamored of the counterinsurgency measures of Gen. David Petraeus in 
Iraq.[9] Strikingly, Galula is mostly matter-of-fact about torture, and mentions 
that the “single most important improvement in our counterinsurgency operations 
in Algeria” was the improvement in the detention and interrogation facilities of 
the colonial military.[10] 
Roger Trinquier, who was a central figure in the Battle of Algiers and 
whose Modern Warfare also appears under the emblem of the US Army Command 
and General Staff College, writes that the terrorist 
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must be made to realize that, when he is captured, he cannot be treated as an 
ordinary criminal, nor like a prisoner taken on the battlefield…. [He] is not asked 
about details about himself or about attacks that he may or may not have 
committed, but rather for precise information about his organization…. No lawyer 
is present for such an interrogation. If the prisoner gives the information 
requested, the examination is quickly terminated; if not, specialists must force his 
secret from him. Then, as a soldier he must face the suffering, and perhaps the 
death, he has heretofore managed to avoid.[11] 
As Eqbal Ahmad pointed out nearly 40 years ago, it is often “men of impeccable 
liberal credentials” who design counterinsurgency 
campaigns.[12] Counterinsurgency is purported by liberal commentators to be 
the “softer” alternative to massive firepower, even “armed social science.”[13] In 
the 1960s, the social scientific fashion was modernization theory and US forces 
built schools and health clinics in support of their pacification efforts. Today, 
culture is at the core of academic fashion, and so counterinsurgencies are all 
about “cultural sensitivity.” And yet, the supposedly sensitive option of 
counterinsurgency relies upon the gathering of human intelligence. Acquiring 
human intelligence, in turn, depends upon the capture of those with information 
and the extraction of that information by “specialists.” Geographic distance, the 
“otherness” of the insurgents, methods that do not leave physical marks and are 
“plausibly deniable”—all this has protected these “specialists” in torture. 
Law 
Traceless torture is enabled by toothless law. If a 1994 US statute and the 
elaborate Uniform Code of Military Justice forbid torture, ambiguities in the 
former and the practice of the latter through courts-martial has meant that those 
accused of torture have often managed to escape serious—if any—punishment. 
Juries of soldiers’ peers have often weighed the military’s morale against the 
letter of the law and frequently voted to acquit. Indeed, inquiries into US torture 
have historically been forced through political mobilization rather than legal 
procedure. As early as the 1915 US invasion of Haiti, Marines accused of killing 
hundreds of Haitian prisoners were let off without punishment. Courts-martial 
dismissed cases because of “insufficient evidence,” and subsequent investigations 
were stonewalled. None of the US brutalities were publicized until election-year 
party politics brought them to light and a Congressional inquiry finally took place 
in 1921.[14] 
In the “war on terror,” the only people court-martialed for torturing Iraqis have 
been low-ranking soldiers, with the highest-ranking officer to appear in court—a 
colonel—seeing charges dismissed in two days. A number of the well-known 
officers involved in the atrocities have in fact been promoted. For example, Capt. 
Carolyn Wood, who according to the Pentagon’s own investigation transferred a 
number of “enhanced interrogation methods” from Afghanistan to Abu Ghraib, 
was awarded a Bronze Star and assigned to teach interrogation methods at Fort 
Huachuca in Arizona.[15] Further, the torture inflicted at Guantánamo Bay and in 
Afghanistan has been so well hidden that news of it leaks out in dribs and drabs, 
foreclosing the possibility of bringing perpetrators to justice. 
More complicated has been the outsourcing of torture to proxies in what has 
come to be known as extraordinary rendition, certainly an innovation of the Bush 
administration, even if the basic process of rendition has historical precedent in 
British practices[16] and legal scaffolding erected by the Clinton 
administration.[17] Detention and torture at Guantánamo Bay (and also at the 
US bases on the island of Diego Garcia) are cloaked by extraterritoriality. The 
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base at Guantánamo is a legal no man’s land that ostensibly “belongs” to Cuba, 
but it is indefinitely leased to the US and therefore is not really in either country. 
Rendition and the holding of detainees in territorially ambiguous locales are 
instances of defining the boundaries of national territory so as to locate “enemies” 
outside those boundaries—and push them outside the reach of domestic law. 
The most significant rupture effected by the Bush administration practices, 
however, has been the concerted attempt to transform the use of torture in 
counterinsurgency from ade facto occurrence, kept invisible from the prying eyes 
of the public, into a de jure process, complete with a new corpus of laws to 
support it. The White House has crafted bills for ratification by a supine 
Congress—such as the Military Commissions Act of 2006—that grant retrospective 
immunity to torturers. It has further defended before the Supreme Court the 
suspension of habeas corpus, the use of military commissions and the 
circumvention of federal laws and international legal opinions. 
One of the administration’s most innovative factories of legal opinion has been 
the Office of the Legal Counsel at the Justice Department. The opinions issued 
there set the parameters of action for the executive branch, essentially at White 
House request. By stacking this office with lawyers amenable to enhancing 
presidential powers and immune to counterarguments—at least in its first term—
the Bush administration secured legal cover for the interrogators of the Defense 
Department and the CIA. It did so through the now declassified “torture memos” 
drafted primarily by Jay Bybee and John Yoo. These memos infamously defined 
physical torture as “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious 
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function or even 
death,” while in order for psychological torture to be counted as such the memos 
required it to have lasted for “months or even years.”[18] Concern about the 
legality of these Justice Department memos was substantial enough to compel 
CIA officials to seek additional written authorization from the White 
House.[19] The boldness of interpreting the law in distorted ways to suit an 
executive branch bent on war is not without precedent in the US,[20] but the 
number of people possibly subjected to torture sanctioned thereby—by some 
estimates, tens of thousands of detainees held in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantánamo 
and black sites around the world—is staggering. 
Race 
Perhaps what accounts for torture becoming less taboo is the “otherness” of those 
subjected to it. Race, or the various euphemisms for it, was central to colonial 
conquest and also, in tacit ways, underlies the liberal interventionist projects of 
today. If nineteenth-century empires justified their domination through their 
supposed civilizational or racial superiority, the imperial project of the twenty-first 
century either refers to inferior cultures or, in its more sophisticated versions, 
invokes a savage chaos which only pax Americana will allay. 
In the Philippines of the early twentieth century, American imperialists saw 
themselves as bringing civilization to a land of savages and barbarians, and to 
delegitimize the Philippine Republic, they portrayed the Philippine society as “a 
set of fragmented and warring ‘tribes’ that were ‘incapable’ of 
nationality.”[21] The designation of the Filipinos as “lower races” gave carte 
blanche to many US soldiers and officers to subject both guerrillas and civilians to 
violence. A US Army marching song composed during the Philippine wars, titled 
“The Water Cure in the P.I.,” included verses such as: 
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Get the good old syringe boys and fill it to the brim 
We’ve caught another nigger and we’ll operate on him 
Let someone take the handle who can work it with a vim 
Shouting the battle cry of freedom[22] 
The water cure, when administered to a foreign person imagined as fitting an 
imported notion of racial inferiority, was made a part of the battle cry of freedom. 
Here also continuities persist. The description of Iraqis as a seething mass of 
recalcitrant tribes occurs again and again in the writings of the “warrior-scholars” 
of the US military. But there have been innovations in the language of 
racialization. If “race”—the institutionalization of perceived physiognomic 
difference—is no longer considered a polite way of speaking of lower orders, 
“culture” is. Tony Lagouranis, an interrogator in Iraq, describes his training at 
Abu Ghraib before he began work there: 
Arabs, apparently, can’t create a timeline. “They don’t think linearly or rationally. 
They have a different relationship with truth than we do. They prefer the beautiful 
to the true. They rely on metaphor instead of facts. They think through 
association, not logic or reason.” Okay, so the people who invented algebra can’t 
think logically? I started to fade out again, but there were some things that 
directly pertained to my future interrogations: “Lying is not taboo or dishonorable 
to Arabs…. So you can’t trap them in a contradiction or force them to admit 
they’re lying. They’ll consider you impolite or uncultured….” Our instructor wasn’t 
relying on a very large body of research to produce these “facts.” He essentially 
borrowed everything he said from a single book, The Arab Mind by Raphael 
Patai.[23] 
Portrayal of a population as culturally backward is only a crude retread of openly 
racist thinking. This version, with its gross generalizations, encourages a standard 
of behavior from the soldiers toward Iraqis that would be unacceptable with those 
“like us.” Because the Iraqi prisoner is always already construed as a liar, 
violence to extract the elusive truth from him is sanctioned. 
A more sophisticated version of this racialist thinking sets “their” pre-modernity 
against “our” post-modernity, and envisions “their” societies as “vacuums of 
chaos and massacre” into which “American military power, together with 
European money and humanitarian motives,”[24] produces “a world in which the 
efficient and well-governed export stability and liberty, and which is open for 
investment and growth.”[25] If “they” are barbarians, then the exercise of 
violence against their bodies and lives, while regrettable, becomes a side effect of 
the establishment of order and stability. What has been most notable about the 
defenders of “empire lite” is their silence in the face of torture seen in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and their tacit defense of it. Thus, the “ticking bomb” scenario 
becomes a liberal’s viable argument for torture,[26] while the same lawyer who 
defended a Guantánamo detainee’s right to habeas corpus can argue that 
preventive detention should be incorporated into the body of US law.[27] In the 
latter instance, “criminalizing group membership” is mentioned as a possible—and 
regrettably necessary—consequence. Given that we live in the age of profiling, 
the group whose membership can become a crime can just as easily be an 
identity group—all Arabs, say, or all salafi Muslims. 
Last Words 
The transcript of the interrogations of Mohammad al-Qahtani, detainee number 
063 at Guantánamo, is instructive despite the gaps and silences therein.[28] Al-
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Qahtani was interrogated continuously for 50 days, during which he was allowed 
to sleep only in four-hour blocks every 20 hours, if that. On the third day, al-
Qahtani, who was on hunger strike, was given several bags of fluid intravenously 
and prevented from using the lavatory. The logs report impassively that the 
“detainee goes in his pants” while his interrogation continues. By the fourth day, 
he has to be forced to stand every 15 minutes in order to keep awake. After the 
first week, he has painfully swollen limbs and has been compelled to exercise, 
been given an enema and forced to have intravenous fluids. In the second week, 
after his beard and hair are forcibly shaven and he is disoriented by being moved 
between different interrogation rooms while hooded, the interrogators use “Pride 
and Ego Down, Fear Up Harsh and Invasion of Space by a Female” as 
interrogation approaches. By then, he is severely dehydrated and his heart rate 
has dropped to 35 beats per minute. After he is revived in the hospital, he is 
returned to the interrogation room. In the third week, the regime of 
interrogations, forced listening to loud music or white noise, forced intravenous 
feeding and the aforementioned interrogation methods continues. 
By the fourth week, after more forced shaving, loud music and struggles over 
food and drink, the interrogators leash al-Qahtani and force him to perform dog 
tricks. “A towel was placed on the detainee’s head like a burka with his face 
exposed and the interrogator proceeded to give the detainee dance lessons.” In 
the fifth week, al-Qahtani is subjected to yet more crushingly similar assaults 
while told that his mother and sisters are whores: “At this point of the discussion 
I was forehead to forehead with the detainee and he stated that he would rather 
be beaten with an electrical wire than to have me constantly in his personal space. 
Also, he stated that he would rather die at my hands than to be subjected to my 
invasion of his personal space. He stated that this is unbearable to him, my being 
in his personal space.” He is recorded as weeping on a number of occasions. By 
the sixth week, he is denied the right to pray unless he “gives something up,” has 
had water thrown at him, been questioned continuously, subjected to white noise, 
forced to strip in front of women and straddled by a woman interrogator. In the 
seventh week, the forced sleeplessness continues, as do the repetitious 
questioning, struggles over eating and drinking, and al-Qahtani’s weeping. Four 
years later, agents of the Pentagon’s Criminal Investigation Task Force told 
MSNBC that al-Qahtani could not be tried because of “what was done to him.” Al-
Qahtani is still held in Guantánamo. 
Al-Qahtani’s interrogation logs are extraordinary, not only because of the cruel 
techniques based on reverse-engineered SERE methods and whose persistence 
over a period of 50 days is horrifying, but also because of their very tedious 
banality. The use of culturally calibrated abuses, the refusal to believe that al-
Qahtani may be ignorant of something questioned, rather than cunningly evasive 
about it, the bureaucratic conscientiousness with which every exercise break and 
lavatory trip is recorded—all are prosaically familiar and yet malevolently 
innovative. The interrogators treat al-Qahtani as a conniving enemy whose slow-
motion mental breakdown is taken to be a performance and further proof of his 
familiarity with the Manchester Document, with which al-Qaeda operatives are 
said to be instructed in resisting interrogation. In the isolation of Guantánamo, 
US military intelligence officers have all the time and legal sanction in the world 
to do as they please to detainee 063. Al-Qahtani and others do not have access 
to lawyers; they are not charged with any crime; and they are held indefinitely. 
Al-Qahtani was not subjected to waterboarding, beating or rape, though he was 
short-shackled, frightened with a dog and sexually humiliated. Other “high-value 
detainees” such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, however, have been 
waterboarded.[29] The detainee known as Abu Zubayda apparently lost his mind 
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under torture.[30] The CIA has destroyed the recordings of their interrogation 
and torture. The prison camp at Guantánamo Bay continues to hold detainees 
whom the hastily assembled military tribunals have found to be innocent but the 
administration refuses to release. Military commissions are still enshrined in law, 
even if the Supreme Court has ruled a clause therein that suspendshabeas 
corpus unconstitutional. Torture is now forbidden by law, even if the CIA is still 
granted an exception to that law. Scores of thousands of detainees are still held 
in Iraq, Afghanistan and various black sites throughout the world. Detention as an 
instrument of intelligence gathering continues to be preserved as a central tactic 
of counterinsurgency in the military manuals produced by the Pentagon’s new 
breed of warrior-scholars. Ultimately, the lessons of torture have been learned 
bodily, and as long as the US military fights asymmetric wars in defense of its 
economic and geopolitical dominance among racialized peoples of the Third World, 
those corporeal memories of torture will arise again and again in concrete prison 
cells far from the gaze of the horrified public. 
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